Where do NATO countries get their matériel?

Choosing your friends wisely

It’s a question to which I had an inkling of an answer but decided to verify it with the world’s authority on such things: ChatGPT.

Here’s what it said:

NATO countries typically procure the majority of their military matériel from a combination of domestic defense industries and international suppliers. Here are some key points regarding procurement sources:

1. Domestic Production: Many NATO countries have established their own defense industries that produce a range of military equipment, including vehicles, weapons, and technology. Countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have robust defense sectors. [I think that’s right.]

2. International Partnerships: NATO members often collaborate on defense projects, sharing technology and resources. This includes joint development programs, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35). [Hm.]

3. United States: The U.S. is a major supplier of military equipment to NATO allies, providing advanced technology, aircraft, and weaponry. Many European countries rely on U.S. defense contracts for key systems. [That’s the one.]

4. European Defense Cooperation: European nations are increasingly working together to enhance their defense capabilities through initiatives like the European Defense Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which aim to foster joint procurement and development. [That’s the new one.]

5. Third-Party Suppliers: NATO countries also procure matériel from non-NATO countries, depending on specific needs and capabilities. This can include equipment from countries like Israel, South Korea, and others. [One should always choose one’s friends carefully.]

Overall, NATO's procurement landscape is characterized by a mix of domestic production, international collaboration, and reliance on key allies, particularly the United States. [Spot on, Chatty.]

I asked a similar question to the Lithuanian army. Here’s what it said:

Weaponry and technology

Procurement

While carrying out procurement, the Lithuanian Armed Forces seek to ensure that the weapons and military equipment to be acquired are reliable, modern and correspond to NATO requirements and modern defence technologies used around the world. Priority is given to developing deployable military units with modern capabilities, especially in line with the Allies in communications systems and intelligence. Lithuania allocates no less than 20 per cent of its defence budget to the procurement and modernisation of its arms and military equipment. The improvement of education and training systems and supporting scientific research designed to strengthen the Lithuanian Armed Forces are also of great importance.

It was not easy for procurement specialists to gain recognition from the Allies as equal partners, since the Lithuanian Armed Forces had to start from scratch by rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure left behind by the withdrawing Soviet army in 1993. From the very beginning, the Lithuanian Armed Forces received a great amount of weaponry and equipment from the USA, Denmark, Sweden and Germany.

Communications systems

The development and enhancement of the Security of Strategic Communications and Information System of National Defence is a priority at all times. Much attention is also paid to the implementation of the appropriate security measures.

Lithuanian specialists, together with the military, have worked out the Tactical Automated Command Control Information System, which is one of the most sophisticated among NATO systems. In order to strengthen advanced communication, information and intelligence capabilities, Lithuania is planning to launch a number of initiatives, including the possible creation of a unified Network Enabled Capability (NEC) system and an integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) system.

Armament

The standard service assault rifle of the Lithuanian Armed Forces is the Heckler & Koch G-36 KA4, and the standard pistol is the Glock 17. The Special Operations Forces are equipped with a variety of weapons, including MP-5 submachine guns with various modifications, G36K carbines and sniper rifles. The Lithuanian Armed Forces are also equipped with machine guns, including the GPMG MG-3, the FN MAG, and the 12.7mm (.50 cal.) M-2 QCB. They also employ AT-4 and Carl Gustav anti-tank grenade launchers, H&K GMG high-velocity grenade launchers, and low-velocity AG-36 under-the-barrel grenade launchers, in addition to light and heavy mortars and Howitzer M-50s.
Lithuania continues to maintain anti-tank defence (Javelin) and mine clearance capabilities. The importance of air defence and protection against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and other capabilities will not decrease in the future.
The short-range Stinger Air Defence Missile System has replaced the SA-7. The contract covered eight vehicle-mounted launchers and 69 RPM/Block 1 international missiles. Portable radar systems were included, as well as training and logistics support.
Other ongoing projects that deal with fleet and aircraft modernisation include the procurement of patrol vessels, mine countermeasure ships and further C-27J transport aircraft. They also include the improvement of airspace surveillance capabilities and the planned purchase of G/A Radio, Navigation and Meteo Systems.

Transportation

The Iron Wolf Motorised Infantry Brigade is equipped with M-113 armoured personnel carriers and high-mobility HMMWVs. Another project which is under way covers the procurement of wheeled personnel carriers, which will replace tracked vehicles. In 2006, custom-made highmobility Land Rover Defenders, adapted for special operations, reached the Special Operations Forces. In 2007, the Lithuanian Armed Forces acquired 50 Finnish-made high-mobility 8x8 multifunctional SISU E11T combat support armoured trucks.

Infrastructure

The renewal and modernisation of the infrastructure goes hand in hand with the changing tasks and needs of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. The improvement of barracks, engineering hubs and the living and service conditions of the troops have always been a top priority. Another important ongoing infrastructure project focuses on the further development of Šiauliai Airbase, which is important for ensuring host nation support for NATO's Air-Policing Mission over the Baltic States.

Lithuania’s small arms tend to come from Germany. ISTAR is American, the MP-5 (Maschinenpistole) is German, the M50 howitzer is Israeli/French, the AG-36 under-the-barrel grenade launcher is German, and, as the title suggests, gets fitted underneath the barrel of another weapon, here a Latvian G36KV carbine.

The short-range Stinger Air Defence Missile System (SAM, or MANPADS) is American. The HMMWV is a Humvee, and is American. The Land Rover Defender is made in the UK, and in Australia, Brazil, South Africa, Pakistan, Türkiye, Malaysia, Jordan, Kenya, Thailand and Zimbabwe. Take your pick, but check before you assume that Lithuania’s are sourced in the UK, since they may possibly come from a country that drives on the right. I wonder what side of a battlefield they drive on?

Well, that’s all right, then isn’t it? As long as matériel is not sourced from our potential enemies, then that’s okay. And no one is less of a potential enemy than one’s allies. That, at least, used to be the theory. But serious noises are now being made in non-US NATO circles expressing worries about whether or not the US can be considered an ally. More than that, whether the US might potentially become an enemy of NATO. Whilst one might laugh off the cosying-up between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin (and ask, in all seriousness, how much it is reciprocated by the Russian leader), the fact remains that the US has made territorial threats against two NATO members (Denmark and Canada) and has refused to discount the use of force, in blatant contravention of the UN Charter (not to mention the North Atlantic Treaty), in making good on those threats. Meanwhile the US seems to be deploying barter techniques to assure Canada of security under the arrangements that have, in fact, been in place for over 75 years. Whilst that might be a ground for closing the US out of intelligence-sharing arrangements, it appears to be the US itself that is trying to close Canada out of precisely those sharing arrangements; that from an administration that has in recent times shared quite some tactical information with wives, family lawyers and members of the press, to wit through its Defense Secretary, Mr Hegseth.

Just consider for a second: the US president has said he would welcome the Russian invasion of a territory that had failed to keep up its military budget in line with NATO requirements. So NATO countries are busy upping their budgets to fulfil NATO requirements. Meanwhile, the US president is threatening to invade NATO allies himself. Well, not himself, of course: other people. Perhaps it is just as well that NATO countries are arming: in order potentially to repel another NATO country.

Mr Hegseth has been reluctant to enter into discussion regarding his Signal indiscretions but recently, in Singapore, he berated NATO for not stepping up to buy more armaments in order to defend themselves with strength against the danger posed by nations such as China. And, large amounts of the matériel that NATO countries, like Lithuania, would need to purchase in order to meet Mr Hegseth’s exacting standards just happen to be manufactured in … the US.

US defence equipment is not cheap. There is a widespread belief (see here) that Pentagon waste (one department of government that notably did not get laid … waste in Mr Elon Musk’s recent slash and burn circus) is rampant, and overpricing by defence contractors is cemented into the procurement system. That means that not only the Pentagon, but the governments of all the other NATO countries likewise get taken for a ride when they procure military stuff from America. And there’s not much they can do about it, because the American president is threatening to let Russia invade them with impunity if they don’t.

Mr Hegseth is not a persuasive character. He is, instead, a bit of a bully. He’s a smooth-talking TV host (even if he thinks the “N” in “NATO” stands for “North Atlantic”, whereas it’s more the “NA” bit that stands for that, and it certainly doesn’t stand for the publication The Atlantic, which I guess is where his leak to the press came from). If one allows an assumption to arise that his recommendations are not intended to feather his own nest, or that of those he holds dear, then that would tend to the counter-intuitive.

I cannot predict the future, but I can predict the past. Build-ups of armaments don’t just stay in storage. Mr Hegseth’s encouragement to accumulate piles of bombs and bullets is not going to fully satisfy the defence contractors who supply them. They are at some point going to want to see them fired and dropped, so they can supply more. A bomb is useless to its maker until it is set off, after all.

Now, there is an argument over Taiwan, and it’s not entirely comfortable: the Chinese Civil War of 1927 to 1949 was a scrappy affair, fought between anti-imperialist communists, under Mao Tse-tung, and the Kuomintang. Scrappy, because after the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, and following establishment of the Republic, there was an attempt by Yuan Shikai to re-establish an imperial dynasty which, somewhat like the endeavours in Haiti to establish a kingdom and an empire, ended in mutual recrimination. For a long while what would become the two sides, Communist and Kuomintang, cooperated, especially in light of the Japanese invasion of northern China and Manchuria. Between 1927 and 1937, the Nationalist Kuomintang had obtained the upper hand in much of China. After the Japanese incursions, the two formed an alliance to repel the invader and, as soon as Japan had been persuaded to turn tail, the Civil War resumed, this time with the Communists ultimately prevailing and forcing the Nationalists back onto the island of Formosa, now Taiwan. The Chinese Civil War was no minor conflict. As enemies of Japan, China technically qualified as a western Ally, but the west has rarely depicted them as such, because of the Cold War and the tendency to mistrust China, which was, and is, nothing less than mutual. But that war cost China around 13 million of its citizens. What would follow cost even more.

With all of mainland China in Communist hands, the Communists set about their post-imperial policy programme, some 22 years later than intended. It was directed by Mao Tse-tung. His policies resulted in the deaths of tens of millions of people in China during his reign, mainly due to starvation, but also through persecution, prison labour in laogai, and mass executions. Mao constructed what has become the modern PRC, and part of that may be seen as good and part may be seen as bad, and part may be seen as inevitable and part may be regarded as simply unfortunate. But the People’s Republic has never relinquished its claim to the island of Taiwan. They won the Civil War and they want to vanquish over the Nationalists. Petty? Or justified?

Imagine a revolution in the United States, with Republicans and Democrats drawing up battle lines. The one party is driven back, with loss after loss, until all they can do is board ships and sail for the safety of Hawaii. There they establish a rival United States—Lilliputian by comparison with their huge counterpart on the mainland, but safe from attack thanks to the wide stretch of Pacific Ocean separating the two. Or imagine a revolution in England, which sees King Charles retreat with his loyal troops to the Isle of Wight. The Solent, with its two tides a day, thus offering security on an island where steamers are the dirty brown things that come out the back end of Cowes. Or how about this one? A few scattered islands in the South Atlantic, situated but 350 miles from their nearest landfall, the Republic of Argentina, and owned and, at no small cost, defended by another country which is located over 8,000 miles distant. The Falkland Islands are British to this day partly because a former Foreign Secretary of the UK once said that Britain probably didn’t much want them, so Argentina took them and Britain insisted they were British, and could be given away, but not taken. Peter Carrington immediately resigned his office, and I’m not entirely convinced it was because he felt he’d been wrong, but rather that the policy of recovering the Falklands was.

Image: in April 1984, this dirty, brown, long-serving steamship has been loaded onto a pontoon for transport from the port of Cowes, Isle of Wight, to the River Thames, and ultimately for preservation. What did you think I meant?

Ai, ai, ai, ai, ai, offshore islands. Should Indonesia be one country? With 18,000 islands—in fact so many that no one has really ever counted them all. What about the Philippines with their 7,641 approximately? Should Britain have ever invaded Ireland? What about the Crimea? Almost an island, and a bone of contention: first Russian, then Soviet, then Ukrainian, now de facto Russian again. Russia invaded the Crimea as a cakewalk in 2014. It’s Ukraine itself that has proved the harder task. Big, bulky clumps of continental territory have that in them. What was destined to become the US was only conquered (in contravention of a treaty the British had signed with the western first nations) because it had guns and the occupants had less formidable weaponry, at least to begin with. Scholars like Howard Zinn have argued that violating Britain’s treaty with the North American natives was the whole point of the Revolution against King George.

Naturally, if you’re Chinese, you will contend that Taiwan is and always has been part of China. It became Chinese in the 17th century. But in the 19th, it was actually ceded to Japan. It was the Nationalists who took it off Japan, and now the Communists want it for themselves. If this seems like an unseemly squabble, it’s probably because it is. It has little to do with irredentist claims and everything to do with political systems and world domination. I would say one thing: beware when the United States offers to help you overthrow an oppressor. For its aim may be to liberate you from the oppressor but not to liberate you from oppression, as the US steps neatly into the former oppressor’s shoes. Should Taiwan stand its ground, or call upon American help to sustain its independence from the Communists? Does Taiwan’s value to the US lie in its semi-conductor industry? Why, Mr Trump: you should be making the ones you need in the US, should you not?

It may well be that the US (and Lithuania, and Denmark, and Canada) have something more to fear than might be apparent to the casual observer. But in a world where the lives of the disposable are disposed of with consummate ease, someone has to appeal on behalf of life, and ask: if there are means to avoid conflict, why are they always so elusive? Because conflict and killing equal cash?